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The European Commission proposed to replace the currently existing Separate Accounting 
by an EU-wide tax system based on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). 
Besides the CCCTB, there is an alternative tax reform proposal, the European Tax Allocation 
System (ETAS). In a dynamic capital budgeting model we analyze the impacts of selected 
loss-offset limitations currently existing in the EU under both concepts on corporate cross-
border real investments of MNE. The analyses show that replacing Separate Accounting by 
either concept can lead to increasing profitability due to cross-border loss compensation. 
However, if the profitability increases, the study indicates that the main criteria of decisions 
on location are the tax rate divergences within the EU Member States. High tax rate 
differentials in the Member States imply significant redistribution of tax payments under 
CCCTB and ETAS. The results clarify that in both reform proposals tax payment 
reallocations occur in favor of the holding. National loss-offset limitations and minimum 
taxation concepts in tendency lose their impact on the profitability under both proposals. 
However, we found scenarios in which national minimum taxation can encroach upon the 
group level, although in our model the minimum taxation’s impacts seem to be slight. 
Moreover, we identify harmful paradoxes in ETAS due to the tax credit mechanism. Our 
results can contribute to the current discussion on corporate group tax harmonization within 
the EU and other economic zones, e.g. the US, and help to anticipate the tax effects of loss-
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The lack of cross-border loss-offset and the divergent tax loss-offset regulations of the 27 EU 
Member States were considered as one of the biggest constraints for multinationals in the 
European Single Market.
1 While several former proposals and studies of the European 
Commission favored a standardization of the loss-offset carry-over in the context of the EU-
harmonization, current discussions focus on a standardization of the corporate taxation as 
well as on a standardization of the groups’ cross-border loss-offset within the EU.
2 Therefore, 
working parties of the European Commission actually elaborate the design of a new 
harmonized corporate taxation concept.
3 Two systems are actually discussed; the Common 




Numerous descriptive and comparative articles illustrate advantages and disadvantages of 
the more noticed CCCTB [e.g., Plaesschaert (2005); Commission of the European Union 
(2003, 2005); Mintz/Weiner (2003); Sørensen (2004); Weiner (2002); Giannini (2002)]. As 
the allocation factor for the consolidated profits is inherent in the system of CCCTB another 
line of literature is based on formula apportionment (FA)
5 that consists especially of US-
American analyses [e.g. Gordon/Wilson (1986); Musgrave (1984); Hellerstein (1968)]. Based 
on these experiences many recommendations are available, such as Hellerstein/McLure 
(2004) who implement a US-style enterprise tax law system in the EU. Several articles deal 
with distortions caused by a different weighting of the factors payroll, property and sales [e.g. 
McLure (1980); Goolsbee/Maydew (2000); Gordon/Wilson (1986); Anand/Sansing (2000); 
Nielsen/Raimondos-Møller/Schjelderup (2001)]. Using the European tax analyzer Jacobs et 
al. (2005) evaluate and compare effects of CCCTB under IFRS on the effective tax burden of 
13 Member States. Fuest/Hemmelgarn/Ramb (2006) analyze the budgetary consequences 
of an EU-wide common tax base and investigate the effects of allocation to the EU Member 
States using empirical figures of the German Central Bank.  
 
                                            
 
1 Cf. European Commission (2001), SEC (2001) 582, p. 242. 
2 Cf. e.g. European Commission (2007a), Taxud E1 OP/RP, 1
st Mach 2007, p. 6. The Academic 
Advisory Council of the German Federal Ministry of Finance confirms the opinion for EU-wide, uniform 
loss-offset regulations under CCCTB. Cf. Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Finance 
(2007), p. 45. The advantages are also discussed; cf. Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance (2007), p. 68.   
3 Cf. European Commission (2007b), Taxud E1 FF, 28. June 2007, p. 6. 
4 Consequently ETAS has been included in the Commission's work programme. Cf. Commission of 
the European Communities (2003), p. 10. 
5 Formula apportionment (FA) became a part to US Tax Law in the early 20th century, Cf. Ford (1933); 
Hellerstein (1968), pp. 488-490; Hellerstein/McLure (2004), p. 208.          3 
 
Another concept is the relatively unknown ETAS designed by Hernler (2004). In specific 
points similar to the proposal of the Home State Taxation
6, ETAS financial and tax 
autonomies of the states are maintained and therefore ETAS is considered to be a possible 
alternative for the transnational taxation of multinational corporations [e.g. Commission of the 
European Communities (2003)]. Hernler (2004) limits the research of ETAS to a comparative 
description with respect to different incomes.  One recommendation; similar to the ETAS 
approach that is currently being discussed by the Academic Advisory Council of the German 
Federal Ministry of Finance; is the “principle of domicile with separate entity accounting” 
[Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of (2007)].
7,8 
 
Analyses of loss-offset under CCCTB are performed by Gérard/Weiner (2003) and 
Oestreicher/Koch (2008). Gérard/Weiner (2003) analyze a cross-border loss-offset within the 
CCCTB under uncertainty and compare the occurring effects with the impacts of the current 
tax system. Inter alia, they find out that tax competition under formula apportionment 
increases with lower tax rates and decreases with higher tax rates, respectively. In their 
analysis they highlight that within a cross-border loss-offset under formula apportionment the 
effects due to the realization of investments are more sensitive with respect to the tax rates 
than under Separate Accounting. However, this analysis is limited to an interpersonal cross-
border loss-offset. That is why the investigation neither considers inter-temporal loss-offset 
nor specific minimum taxation within a defined planning horizon. Oestreicher/Koch (2008) 
investigate the impact of an implementation of the CCCTB and of possible methods for 
achieving an EU-wide loss-offset for multinationals on effective corporate average tax rates. 
Therefore, they apply a comparative-static micro simulation approach within multi-period 
planning. The current existing loss-offset rules; as they are integrated in the tax systems in 
Denmark, Italy or Austria; are included in their analysis. However, temporal restrictions or 
minimum taxation concepts are not analyzed. For ETAS, an analysis with respect to loss-




                                            
 
6 Cf. Lodin/Grammie (1999) and Lodin/Grammie (2001). 
7 Cf. further Schreiber, 2008, pp. 120-123. 
8 In comparison to the Separate Entity Accounting ETAS does not distinguish between residence 
principle and principle of source. That is why different effects occur under ETAS. Furthermore the 
national determination of the taxable income remains for all countries. 
9 The impact of investment incentives on loss-offset rules is discussed rather infrequently within an 
international context. Several papers analyze the impact of a limited loss-offset on the cost of capital, 
on investments and/or financial incentives [Barlev/Levy (1975), Auerbach (1986), Majd/Myers (1986), 
Auerbach/Poterba (1987), Lyon (1990), Lund (2000)]. Studies on American minimum taxation attest to 
their distortional and under certain circumstances inhibitory impact on investment [Schnee (2004), 
Dworin (1987), Chorvat/Knoll (2003), Lyon (1997), Bernheim (1989)].           4 
 
A comprehensive economic analysis and quantitative investigation that integrates an 
intertemporal loss-offset in form of a limitation in time or a minimum taxation in a multi-
periodic model for a group has neither been made for the CCCTB system nor for the ETAS. 
To close this gap, a comprehensive economic and quantitative investigation of CCCTB and 
ETAS including intertemporal cross-border loss-offset in contrast to selected loss-offset and 
minimum taxation regulations of the currently mandatory tax systems is subject of the 
following analysis. This analysis is not performed to emphasize weak points of ETAS or 
CCCTB. The aim of this investigation is to devise the effects of the analyzed tax reform 
systems as they are currently elaborated. We illustrate the two proposals in a formal and 
descriptive way in section 2. In section 3 we introduce our model framework and provide a 
multi-period analysis of marginal investment decisions of a multinational group in section 4. 
We use Separate Accounting as our reference system for the subsequent analysis in a 
dynamic capital budgeting model. We show that mandatory loss-offset limitations in either 
group taxation concept become less weighty, which is also a result of the cross-border loss-
offset. In contrast to CCCTB under ETAS two possibly opposite tax effects and thus tax 
paradoxes can occur due to the tax credit mechanism.  
 
Although cross-border group taxation is mandatory within the USA, the following results can 
contribute to US tax reform discussions as well, since such group taxation is only possible for 
federal tax purposes. On State level the tax payer has to face the same framework as the EU 
Member States and non-existing cross-border group taxation. 
 
2 Group taxation proposals  
2.1. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)  
 
CCCTB is a system based on one common consolidated tax base for multinational entities 
(MNE) operating transnationally in the European Union. European tax reformers intend to 
include a new tax base that is not founded on national tax law. All Member States have to 
cooperate on determining this tax base. The intention is to apply CCCTB uniformly in all 
Member States and to eliminate country-specific differences.
10  
 
Various working parties of the Commission are currently examining what conditions have to 
be met in order to qualify for CCCTB. However, it has already been agreed that it shall apply 
to the regulations for a group of qualified companies that are domiciled in the participating 
                                            
 
10 Cf. Cnossen (2001), pp. 532-535; European Commission (2001), p. 403; Mintz/Weiner (2003), pp. 
695-697; Plasschaert (2005), pp. 64-67.           5 
 
Member States. One working group is currently discussing the requirements that have to be 
fulfilled by participating corporations and which subsidiaries will be apportioned to the 
consolidated companies.
11 The EU Commission favors the introduction of an option to be 
taxed under CCCTB. In any case, the corporations that are eligible must be defined.
12  
 
To determine the proportionate tax base, the profits are calculated according to uniform 
European regulations for each affiliate.
13 Subsequently, the affiliates' profits are consolidated 
to yield an amalgamated figure. The next step is for this figure to be apportioned to the 
Member States using a yet to be defined key.
14 While this restricts the Member States' tax 
autonomy, they still determine their own tax rates. The tax burden is calculated by multiplying 
the tax rate with the proportionately apportioned CCCTB. The majority of issues specific to 
CCCTB, notably consolidation and apportionment, have not been resolved so far. Should 
US-style formal apportionment be implemented, the factors payroll, property and sales would 
become very significant.
15 Consolidation is expected to be based on IFRS, modified by tax 
aspects. Working groups have been established at the EU level to focus exclusively on 
drafting components of CCCTB.
 16       
 
Besides the general requirements some specific questions remain unanswered. Amongst 
these questions e.g. is the treatment of losses. In a meeting of the “Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base Working Party” (CCCTB WP) the following procedures were 
discussed:
17 
a)  Losses from periods before the entry to the CCCTB-multinational can only be 
offset pro-rata against group gains. The maximum clearable loss is the 
apportioned part of the common tax base. 
                                            
 
11 Cf. European Commission (2006), p. 6. 
12 Cf. European Commission (2007), p. 2. 
13 Moreover, it is still unclear whether “non-business income” (e.g., interest or dividends) is supposed 
to be included in the loss compensation or taxed separately. Several authors discuss the 
differentiation between business and non-business and their eventually negative effects. Cf. Weiner 
(2005), p. 22, Agúndez-García (2006), pp. 17-18, Spengel/Wendt (2007), Sureth/Üffing (2008). For the 
following consideration we assume non-business income is included in the consolidated business 
income so that it is not allocated directly to the respective business entity. This proceeding avoids 
distortions caused by different tax treatment of interests within the different tax reform proposals. The 
working group for the elaboration of formula apportionment also tends towards a unique tax treatment 
of business and non-business income due to the increase of the proposal’s complexity and the 
possibilities of profit shifting. Cf. European Commission (2007c), p. 7. Furthermore, we avoid another 
assumption about the height of the interests that are included in the assumed cash flow. Due to the 
research question and the former explained assumptions we can abstract from a differentiation of the 
business and the non-business income.      
14 Cf. European Commission (2006), pp. 7-9. 
15 E.g., cf. Goolsbee/Maydew (2000), p. 125; European Commission (2001), p. 51; Eggert/Schjelderup 
(2003), pp. 439-446; Wellisch (2004), pp. 24-41. See section 3.2. 
16 Cf. European Commission (2006), pp. 4-5. 
17 Cf. European Commission (2007a), p. 6.          6 
 
b)  Group-losses remain in the group level and are not apportioned to the companies. 
Therefore, remaining losses have to be carried forward on the group level.    
c) In case of a leaving company, the pro-rata remained losses cannot be 
apportioned to the company but remain on the group level. (This was the 
tendency of the discussion, but still two experts vetoed.) 
d)  How to deal with remaining losses in case of a liquidation of the group has not yet 
been clarified. Whereas few experts are pro-apportionment of the final loss to the 
diverse companies, others favor an addition to the parent company.  
According to these and other documents, we will close further loopholes with assumptions.  
 
2.2 European Taxation Allocation System (ETAS) 
 
The European Tax Allocation System is a proposal to harmonize the European Union’s 
international corporate taxation.
18 The system is based on the current tax systems across the 
EU and in specific points similar to the Home State Taxation. If a group of affiliated 
companies satisfy certain conditions, the ETAS holding can opt to include its subsidiary or 
subsidiaries in the ETAS group. As fundamental prerequisites the parent company and 
subsidiaries have to be domiciled in and managed from an EU Member State. In addition, the 
companies must prepare their financial statements by the same closing date. Also, the 
parent company must hold; indirectly or directly; at least 50% of equity or voting rights in the 
subsidiary.
19   
 
In the first step the taxable income and corporate tax liability are determined by the legal tax 
requirements of the Member State of domicile. In the second step the business incomes, 
which are separately determined in each country in accordance with national tax law, are 
added.
20 This so-called “EU tax base” represents the total tax base of the group for the 
considered tax assessment period, and multiplying this amount with the respective tax rate of 
the state of domicile leads to the multinational corporation's EU base tax. The corporate tax 
the subsidiaries have to pay to the respective Member State has to be imputed against the 
EU Base Tax. Any shortfall in taxes must be paid to the parent company's country of 
domicile. Any excess tax paid forms what is known as an EU tax credit carry-forward 
(TCCF), which is credited towards the corporation's tax burden in subsequent years. As this 
                                            
 
18 Cf. European Commission (2003), p. 10. 
19 Cf. Hernler (2004), p. 247. 
20 Cf. Hernler (2004), p. 247.           7 
 
TCCF can be carried forward unlimitedly within the affiliated group, it can be entirely 
compensated by national corporate taxes of the following years.
21,22  
 
Generally, the Member States’ diverse loss-offset rules remain due to the legislative 
autonomy of the respective Member State. Under ETAS, losses have to be differentiated with 
respect to the date and to the place of origin. If losses occur before the subsidiary opts to 
ETAS, the losses will not be included in the EU tax base, but carried forward under the carry-
forward provisions of the subsidiary’s Member State. In contrast, prior losses at the holding’s 
level encroach upon the EU tax base. Subsequent occurring losses of the subsidiary are 
determined in accordance to the mandatory tax law of the state of residency.
23 As only the 
local total income of the subsidiary and likewise of the holding is considered in the EU tax 
base, no local loss-offset regulation affects the EU tax base directly. From the local loss-
offset regulations detached EU loss-offset is the next step for the calculation of the EU tax 
base.    
 
As this proposal is not elaborated in full detail, some questions remain unanswered. One 
example of a moot question is the treatment of the loss-offset on EU tax base level. E.g., 
how are losses and loss carry-forwards going to encroach upon the calculation of the EU tax 
base? One possibility is an unlimited loss carry-forward offset of both the subsidiary and the 
parent company. Another option could be to adopt the respective loss-offset regulation of the 
holding’s Member State.
24 In both cases revenue offices have to record the loss carry-
forwards of each company and each country separately, because the offset-regulations are 
not necessarily identical.  
 
3 Model  
 
The simulation model focuses on tax effects on a cross-border real investment of 
multinationals under the actual tax regimes with Separate Accounting and under the two 
aforementioned group taxation proposals. Under the assumption that multinationals have to 
accept the mandatory tax regulations, we do not focus on possible adjustment activities 
within the company as investing in another project; but on the impact of taxation on the 
                                            
 
21 Cf. Hernler (2004), p. 248; Hernler (2004), p. 394. 
22 By this design the calculation of an apportionment formula is unnecessary since no tax base needs 
to be apportioned.  
23 Hernler only mentions loss carry forwards in his papers. However, due to the maintaining of the 
respective national tax law, we assume that different loss offset rules – and thus also minimum 
taxation concepts – are also applied under ETAS. 
24 Cf. Hernler (2004), p. 250. This is the mentioned option of Hernler.           8 
 
profitability of this chosen real investment.
25 Furthermore, we refer to the impact of the 
concepts on the tax burden of the holding and subsidiary and analyze a possible tax 
payment reallocation between both entities. Therefore, we use a multi-period dynamic capital 
budgeting model which allows us to investigate different settings of group taxation as well as 
diverse loss-offset regulations.  
 
In the following analysis, we assume a multinational corporation which consists of a parent 
company that intends to invest a certain amount of money (equity), denoted by I0 in a real 
investment project in the form of a foreign subsidiary. The subsidiary domiciles in an EU 
Member State denoted by S whereas the parent company´s domicile is in another EU 
Member State denoted by P. Both companies are separately incorporated and we assume 
both companies meet the demands for an option for either group taxation concept.  
 
The multinational entity (MNE) earns cash flows from the investment in each period of the 
considered planning horizon. While the holding earns constant positive cash flows the 
subsidiary generates increasing cash flows starting with negative cash flows. To cover 
various time structures of cash flows but keep comparable investment scenarios we assume 
identical pre-tax future values. Under these assumptions, the analysis provides in-depth 
insight into the interdependencies of cash flow pattern, loss-offset restrictions and group 
taxation. 
 
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the determination of the business income 





The depreciation serves as proxy for all non-cash accruals in each tax system, so no further 
non-cash accruals have to be considered. Moreover, we assume identical depreciation 
regulation in all countries over the time horizon T. Precisely, we assume linear depreciation 
and abstract from country-specific rules for the determination of taxable income. 
                                            
 
25 The impact on corporate investment decisions is beyond the papers topic. But based on the results 
of the profitability changes conclusions about changes in the investment decisions can be assumed 
with reservations. 
26 Jacobs et al. (2005) analyze that the tax bases will be broadened in the Member States, if IFRS 
apply. Cf. Jacobs et al. (2005).  
27 Interrelationships between the holding and the subsidiary are not presumed, so that consolidation 
has not been taken into consideration.  
28 For an implementation of either proposal unique financial reporting standards need to be integrated. 
Whereas under CCCTB one tax base is calculated at group level under ETAS tax competition by tax 
base designs is possible. The consideration of this aspect is beyond the papers topic. 
          9 
 
 
Moreover, we abstract from taxation at shareholder level of the parent company in our 
analysis and focus on the corporate level only. As we assume heterogeneous shareholders 
(individual and institutional) of the investing corporation, it is not possible to find one 
representative tax rate. Instead, the shareholder will have various personal tax rates. Against 
this background, abstracting from the shareholder level is a justified simplification for our 
research question and enables us to concentrate on major impact of minimum taxation at the 
corporate level. We also exclude dividend distributions to the holding and disregard further 
economic integration between holding and subsidiary. This approach allows us to abstract 
from further aspects of financial decisions such as thin capitalization rules or transfer pricing 
within related firms and to isolate effects from loss-offset restrictions in groups.  
 
As a perfect capital market is assumed, the pre-tax debit interest rate for borrowing is 
identical to the pre-tax credit interest rate i.
29 The return from the real investment is 
reinvested at the pre-tax market rate of return in the subsidiary. Thus, the decision is 
assumed to be irreversible. We assume that both the investment (subsidiary) as well as the 
holding will be liquidated at the end of the time horizon t = T. Furthermore, we presume the 
multinational’s liquidation at the carrying value and therefore abstract from capital gains 
taxation. Additionally, as stated under the EU Parent/Subsidiary Directive, withholding tax is 
not deducted from earnings distributed by the subsidiary to the holding, and we abstract from 
withholding tax in T.
30 
 
As a criterion for identifying tax effects we chose the Baldwin yield,
31 which allows us to draw 
conclusions about the profitability (discrimination) of the real investment under the analyzed 
group taxation and diverse loss-offset concepts. For the calculation both future values from 
the capital budgeting technique will be added.   
 
Furthermore, Separate Accounting (SA) is chosen as the comparison value and reference 
system to evaluate possible distortions caused by the respective tax proposal concept. Due 
to the fact that currently cross-border loss-offset possibilities between the business entities 
                                            
 
29 Hence, interest income is fully taxable. 
30 See Section 5 (1) of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive. 














− =  with r : 
Baldwin rate,T : time horizon,FV : future value and PV : present value.          10 
 
only exist in a few Member States
32, an interpersonal loss-offset is not assumed under 
Separate Accounting.  
We start with the following setting: 
 
Interest rate  i  = 0.1
Investment amount = own means
o I  = €8,000,000  
Tax rate in the holding’s country of domicile
P τ  = 0.3 
Tax rate in the subsidiary’s country of domicile
S τ  = 0.3 
Depreciation   S
t D  = €800,000, linear 
Cash flow generated in the holding in t=1
1 t , P CF =  = €1,300,000 
Cash flow generated in the subsidiary in t=1
1 t , S CF =  = -€500,000 
Periodic alteration in cash flows (holding) P g  = €0 
Periodic growth amount of cash flows (subsidiary) S g  = €500,000 
Table 1: Overview of the assumptions of the deterministic analysis 
 
3.1 Considered loss-offset concepts 
 
As we have a variety of loss-offset limitation rules in the EU, we focus on the following major 
concepts in the subsequent analysis:  
i)  Unlimited loss-offset - loss-offset to a tax base of zero, unlimited loss carry-
forward.
33  
ii)  German minimum taxation - unlimited loss-carry-forward, limited loss offset to the 
maximum of €1 million plus 60% of the positive income.
34 The possibility of loss 
carry-backs, as implemented in Germany, is ignored for reasons of simplicity. It 
can be easily shown that its impact on the profitability of an investment is very 
low
35 and only a few countries use this type of loss-offset rule.  
                                            
 
32 Interpersonal loss offset possibilities exist in Austria, Denmark, Italy and France. The prerequisites 
differ and to some extent are highly very restrictive.  
33 Actually 12 member states of the EU use this regulation for their treatment of losses. Among these 
are Belgium, Cyprus Republic, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxemburg, 
Malta, Sweden and Romania.  
34 Cf. § 10d (2) EStG (German income tax code). 
35 According to the analysis by Haegert, L./Kramm, R. (1977), p. 209 as well as Dwenger (2008), p. 
20.          11 
 
iii)  Austrian minimum taxation - loss-offset limit of 75% of the positive income.
36 We 
abstract from the corporate minimum tax [e.g. €6,000 for a Societas Europaeas 
(SE)] since the small amount barely affects our results.   
iv)  Polish minimum taxation - 50% of the originally incurred loss can be offset, losses 
expire after five years.
37 Since we include and analyze loss expirations in cases v) 
and vi) we isolate the minimum taxation from the loss expiration and consider only 
the loss-offset limitation.  
v)  Loss expiration after five years.
38 
vi)  Loss expiration after eight years.
39 
 
Integrating all mentioned regulations into our basic tax framework, we can identify the effects 
of selected types of loss-offset regulations and minimum taxation concepts as well as group 
taxation. Thereby, we simultaneously abstract from the effects of further tax rules in the 
corresponding national tax codes, which enables us to concentrate on the mechanisms 
caused by loss offset restrictions within multinational groups.
40  
 
In the literature a valuation of a remaining loss carry-forward is discussed in detail.
41 In 
contrast to these approaches we abstract from a positive valuation of the remaining loss at 
the end of the planning horizon and set it equal to zero. Evaluating the remaining loss carry-
forward with 0% is possible due to a termination of economic activity. Facing a tightening of 
                                            
 
36 § 2 (2b) ÖEStG (Austrian income tax code) distinguishes between an offset limit and a carry-forward 
border. The former is applied to non-compensable losses (§ 2 (2b) no. 2 ÖEStG), where 75% of these 
losses can only be offset with positive earnings from the same income source. The rest must be 
carried forward. All compensable losses are clearable against 75% of the positive income (Section 2 
para 2b no. 1 ÖEStG). This is referred to as the carry-forward border. In the following analysis only 
compensable losses are considered.    
37 As the loss carry-forward limitation is considered separately, the Polish system is reduced to the 
minimum taxation only. 
38 Eight Member States limit the loss carry-forward to five years; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
39 Eight years serve as a proxy for the remaining countries with different limitation of expiration years; 
Portugal 6 years, Estonia 7 years, Netherlands 9 years, Finland 10 years and Spain 15 years.  
40 To be able to isolate effects due to the minimum concepts we ignore that a loss offset-limitation may 
be interdependent with other tax rules of the respective country. E.g., the level of the American 
Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (CAMT) is influenced by factors such as engaged subsidies, 
depreciation and others. 
41 E.g. Niemann (2004c), pp. 376-377 Knirsch (2005), pp. 70-74, Haegert/Kramm (1977), p. 205, 
Barlev/Levy (1975), p. 178, Mintz (1988), p. 227, Schneider (1988). Although these studies use 
different valuations, e.g. 20% of the remaining loss carry-forward, these analyses always assume a 
constant fraction that reflects possible future tax saving and do not illustrate the impact of different 
final tax values for diverse loss-offset or minimum taxation concepts. Assuming a fixed value for all 
considered concepts i) to vi) would neglect this important aspect as the different los-offset regulations 
lead to different purchase prices that a potential buyer is willing to pay for a remaining loss. Then, 
therefore we would have to build a rank order of the impacts of the respected loss-offset regulation. 
Without any data this assumption can´t be made. Furthermore an evaluation of 0% for all concepts 
seems to be the simplest and non-distortive solution.          12 
 
the shell purchase regulations in several countries
42 it is appropriate to refrain from a positive 
valuation of remaining loss carry-forwards.
43  
 
3.2 Allocation Factor 
 
Under CCCTB, it remains unclear how in the end the consolidated business income will be 
allocated to the Member States. A presumable proposal for formula apportionment in the EU 
is based on the Canadian or US tax law, so that the allocation depends on sales, property 
and (or) payroll.
44 Currently authorities of the European Commission are discussing the form 
of allocation of the tax base to the EU Member States. A definite decision has not yet been 
reached. A promising approach is a formula based on company-specific data and on the 
three factors payroll, property and sales.
45,46,47 The weighting of the factors is not defined by 
the authorities. However, an equal weighting of each factor seems to be appropriate for the 
working group specially founded to elaborate the allocation for a CCCTB.
48 Therefore, we 


























































































with    
P θ :   allocation factor for the holding, 
S θ :   allocation factor for the subsidiary, 
                                            
 
42 E.g. § 8b KStG (German Corporate Income Tax Act). Further shell acquisition regulations can be 
found in Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain and Netherlands, see Mennel/Domann (2008).  
43 To abstract from effects caused by remaining loss carry-forwards in T in a deterministic analysis the 
relevant parameters (cash flow time structure, time horizon etc.) have to be set correspondingly. 
44 In the US tax law the factors payroll, property and sales are of particular importance. The common 
“Massachusetts Formula“ provides a valuation of these three factors in equal parts. In contrary the 
Canadian tax law only integrates the factors payroll and sales. However, the respective factors may 
depend on the branch of industry. Cf. Weiner (2005), p. 25. Whereas the Canadian tax law provides a 
unique approach of formula apportionment, the American UDITPA (Uniform Division of Income for Tax 
Purpose Act) that regulates the apportionment is not obligatory. The states can autonomously decide 
about the weighting of formula apportionment, so that it is possible only to opt for one factor. Some 
US-States use sales as single allocation factor. Cf. Wildasin (2000), p. 429. Several authors analyze 
the effects and distortions due to the weighting of the different factors [e.g., McLure (1980), 
Goolsbee/Maydew (2000); Wellisch (2004)]. 
45 Cf. European Commission (2007c), (CCCTB/WP060\docen, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, 13. November 
2007, p. 6.  
46 Eichner/Runkel (2008) show in their Paper, that including the sales factor weakens the sum of fiscal 
external effects and improves the efficiency of corporate tax rates by decreasing the distortions of the 
international taxation, p. 586. 
47 The working group for the elaboration of the allocation factor proposes the factors that should be 
integrated in the formula apportionment for CCCTB in detail. Cf. European Commission (2007c), pp. 
7-15. 
48 Cf. European Commission (2007c), p. 6.          13 
 
P :   holding’s factor, 
S:   subsidiary’s factor.  
  
Within the following investigation we use the data of large manufacturing companies (viz., 
turnover in excess of €50M) chosen from the BACH database.
49 To analyze the different 
scenarios initially two EU Member States; Germany and France; are selected.
50 The BACH 
database is based on national databases and contains some disadvantages for reasons of 
comparability and for analyzing the CCCTB.
51 However, for simplicity reasons the database 
allows us to draw general and approximate conclusions about the discriminating and 
subsidized effects of CCCTB in comparison to Separate Accounting and ETAS. Inserting the 
data generated from the BACH database we obtain the following allocation factors for the 
Member States Germany ( 5562 . 0
P = θ )
52 and France ( 4438 . 0
S = θ ).
53 For simplicity reasons, 
these amounts of weighting are assumed for the overall planning horizon and for all 
considered loss-offset limitations.




3.3 Considered Basic Scenarios 
 
In the following analysis, we investigate the selected loss-offset regulations i) to vi) in two 
different basic scenarios. 
Scenario I: 
In the holding’s Member State we do not presume any loss-offset limitations or minimum 
taxation. Occurring losses do not lead to an immediate tax refund but can be carried forward 
unlimited into future periods. However, in the subsidiary’s Member State we integrate the 
selected loss-offset rules i) to vi).  
 
                                            
 
49 BACH is a database containing harmonized annual accounts statistics of non-financial enterprises 
for 11 European countries, Japan and the US. Cf. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8648_en.htm.  
50 Within the sensitivity analysis we investigate further Member States, whose data is available in the 
BACH database. The data can be seen in Appendix 1.  
51 E.g., the database principally includes non-consolidated, national data; the national balance sheets 
are harmonized, but not determined according to uniform taxable income; the selected companies do 
represents neither a complete survey nor a statistically representative sample. 
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54 A shifting of the weighting is imaginable. For simplicity reasons we assume an identical allocation 
factor for the considered planning period. 
55 Since the research question is not to find the best allocation factor, it is appropriate to assume a fix 
formula for the time horizon and refer to possible impacts in case of a parameter change.          14 
 
Scenario II:  
In a second scenario the effects of the considered loss-offset limitations and minimum 
taxation concepts are applied at the holding’s level, whereas no loss-offset limitation is 
integrated in the tax law of the subsidiary’s domicile. We therefore assume that occurring 
losses at the subsidiary’s level can be carried forward unlimitedly into subsequent periods. 
 
Since full details of both proposals have not been outlined yet, further fundamental 
components of the concepts remain unknown. We therefore make appropriate assumptions 
that allow us to identify and generalize the effects from loss offset restrictions. 
•  CCCTB:  If the subsidiary opts for CCCTB, the applicable national loss-offset 
regulations are not applied, but the unitary loss-offset rules at group level are 
adopted. We therefore include a loss-offset at the group level that is currently favored 
by the European Commission and the Academic Advisory Council of the German 
Federal Ministry of Finance.
56 Thus, the tax base calculated by the group’s business 
income less an EU-wide unitary, clearable group loss-offset is then apportioned to the 
business entities.  
For our analysis of basic scenario II we presume diverse loss-offset regulations at the 
holding’s level and an unlimited loss carry-forward in the subsidiary´s state of 
domicile. Therefore, we investigate the selected concepts i) to vi) for the CCCTB-
group.  
•  ETAS: Under ETAS, the different national tax systems of the EU Member States are 
maintained, so that it is necessary to differentiate between the holding’s and the 
subsidiary’s level with respect to the loss-offset regulations. The treatment of the 
prepaid local tax of the subsidiary has not been detailed until now. Hernler assumes 
the prepaid local taxes of the subsidiaries to be credited entirely against the EU Base 
Tax. However, Hernler also mentions a limitation of the EU tax credit.
57 For simplicity 
reasons, we assume an unlimited credit against the EU base tax. In our scenarios we 
also presume an unlimited EU tax credit carry-forward. We additionally assume that 
in the following year the EU tax credit carry-forward can be credited initially against 
the subsidiary’s local tax burden.  
Thus, the tax credit is  
                                            
 
56 Whereas the European Commission proposes a loss-offset at group level, the Scientific Advisory 
Council of the Federal Ministry of Finance approves EU-wide unitary loss-offset regulations. Cf. 
European Commission (2007), p. 6; Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Finance 
(2007), p. 45. 
57 Cf. Hernler (2004), p. 250. If the taxes the subsidiary paid to its country of domicile cannot be 
credited entirely against the group’s tax burden, the multinational’s tax burden would generally be 
higher.          15 
 
a)  either fully utilized and leads to a remaining positive tax liability that has to be 
paid to the holding’s Member State, 
b)  exactly 0, or  
c)  partly utilized and the remainder can be carried forward.  
 
If the amount that may be carried forward cannot be entirely offset, the remainder can 
be compensated in a further step up to the amount of the EU base tax at group level. 
The remaining tax burden has to be paid to the holding’s Member State of domicile. 
Otherwise, if the remainder exceeds the group’s tax burden, the remaining amount is 




 4 Analysis  
4.1 Analysis of Basic Scenario I 
 
Determining the Baldwin yields under the given set of assumptions, we achieve increasing 
profitability (+0.32%) for CCCTB and ETAS in comparison to SA due to the transnational 




Under SA the different loss-offset regulations in the subsidiary´s state have an impact on the 
subsidiary’s future value and hence, on the group Baldwin yield. A minimum taxation or loss-
offset limitation decreases the future value and therefore the Baldwin yield of the subsidiary. 
The most significant negative impact can be seen in case of loss expiration after 5 years       
(-0.261% in comparison to asymmetric taxation), followed by the Austrian concept (-0.018%) 
and the German concept (-0.01%).
60,61  
 
Furthermore, in case of identical tax rates both proposals show identical Baldwin yields for all 
considered loss offset designs.
62 The reasons for these outcomes differ depending on the 
considered tax reform proposal. Based on our assumptions of an unlimited loss-offset in the 
holding´s state and with an option for CCCTB, the holding’s state rules are mandatory for the 
                                            
 
58 This proceeding corresponds to the proposal of ETAS. Cf. Hernler (2004), p. 249.  
59 See Appendix 2.1 for Baldwin yields. 
60 See Appendix 2.1 for Baldwin yields. 
61 Since the research question of this paper is not the impact of the different loss-offset regulations 
itself, no further consideration of the difference is made. But for information about diverse impacts of 
the respective concepts on corporate investment decisions see Dahle/Sureth (2008). 
62 See Appendix 2.1 for Baldwin yields.          16 
 
affiliate as well. Therefore, only national regulations of the holding affect the result and no 
loss-offset limitation occurs at all. In contrast, under ETAS the subsidiary’s national loss-
offset or minimum taxation regulations are of importance, as the overall tax burden can be 
affected by the taxes the subsidiary has to pay to its Member State (EU tax credit). Due to 
the EU tax credit the taxes the subsidiary already paid are credited against the group’s tax 
burden.
63 This result shows that it is in fact possible for the multinational corporation to avoid 
harmful minimum taxation concepts or prejudicial loss-offset regulations at the subsidiary’s 
level by opting for either unitary group taxation concept. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Basic Scenario II 
 
In the second scenario, no loss-offset limitation applies in Separate Accounting because only 
positive cash flows are assumed at the holding’s level. Therefore, all concepts achieve the 
same results and the determined Baldwin yield is identical to the unlimited loss-offset 
limitation (11.867%)
64. The Baldwin yields under ETAS and CCCTB are also identical as 




Under CCCTB a loss-offset limitation is generally possible due to the holding´s tax regulation 
that is mandatory for the whole group. However, under the given assumptions for CCCTB the 
mandatory loss-offset limitation does not apply due to the fact that the high holding´s cash 
flow can be offset within the initial periods of our planning horizon against the subsidiary´s 
loss. 
 
Hence, no limited loss carry-forward emerges at all [concepts v) und vi)] or the business 
income is too small to release a minimum taxation [concepts ii) and iii)]. In this regard all 
considered concepts achieve an identical Baldwin yield of 12.187%. The Polish concept’s 
design linked to the initially occurring loss instead of the business income leads to a small 
negative impact on the Baldwin yield (-0.003%). Only a closer look at the following decimal 
places indicates another minimal negative impact of the Austrian concept (-0.00027%).  
 
                                            
 
63 Relating to our made assumptions the EU base tax is greater than the minimum taxation that has to 
be paid to the subsidiary’s Member State. In case that the EU base tax is lower than the minimum 
taxation concepts, it can prejudicially affect the multinational’s tax burden and can also lead to 
discriminating interest effects. Hence, the multinational corporation has to pay higher taxes. 
64 See Appendix 2.1 for Baldwin yields.  
65 See Appendix 2.1 for the analysis results of scenario II.           17 
 
The same results can be found for ETAS. Since no loss-offset limitation in the subsidiary´s 
state of domicile is ruling, the EU tax credit for all considered concepts are the same and can 
be fully credited against the group’s tax burden. 
 
We can state that with identical tax rates and losses in the subsidiary both proposals lead to 
identically increasing profitability in contrast to SA. Depending on the chosen parameter, 
loss-offset limitations loose their impact irrespective of where they are mandatory.  
 
4.3 Influence of the group taxation proposals on the tax allocation 
 
As the tax reform proposals will be under a severe inspection of all EU Member States, 
another aspect that has to be considered is the tax allocation between holding and subsidiary 
and a possible impact on national tax revenue. Although this consideration is limited on the 
made assumptions, especially in terms of the formula apportionment, first insights can be 
recovered by analyzing the tax burden and payments for our modeled multinational. By 
analyzing the tax liability in the partial model and assuming that the investors do not adjust 
their investment decisions in face of the tax reform we can draw conclusions about a 
possible tax reallocation. We therefore investigate the shift of tax payments between the 
holding’s and the subsidiary’s country for basic scenario I.
66  
 
In both scenarios ETAS and CCCTB achieve identical Baldwin yields but show different tax 
payment allocation of holding and subsidiary. In comparison to SA the Baldwin yields 
increase, due to decreasing tax liabilities.
67 Figure 1 shows the difference in tax payments in 
comparison to SA for the holding, the subsidiary and the total tax burden of scenario I.  
 
The figure shows, the multinational’s total tax burden decreases under both proposals and 
with regard to the different loss-offset limitations from approximately €0.784M to €1.4M.
68  
 
Under CCCTB the subsidiary pays considerably more taxes in comparison to SA, whereas 
the holding´s tax liability decreases (cf. figure 1). This result significantly depends on the 
chosen allocation factor.
69 By choosing another allocation formula the differences could 
                                            
 
66 Identical main results are true for basic scenario II.  
67 This result is restricted by our assumptions, especially by the chosen identical tax rates.  
68 For absolute numbers see Appendix 2.2. 
69 For a further consideration of an impact of the chosen allocation factor see sensitivity analysis in 
chapter 3.3.          18 
 
decrease, but since the factor and the calculated tax base are not similar a reallocation is 





























































































 *with MTC denoting minimum taxation concept 
Figure 1: Tax payment differences in comparison to SA in scenario I 
The same overall result can be seen for ETAS, where the subsidiary´s tax liability stays 
identical due to the maintained national tax rules. Here, the only difference to SA occurs for 
the holding´s tax burden. The decreased total tax liability reduces the holding´s tax liability to 
one hundred percent and therefore also reduces the tax revenue of the holding´s state. 
Under both proposals the differences to SA vary depending on the loss-offset limitation. 
Therefore, countries with higher tax revenue caused by a loss-offset limitation under national 
law receive less tax payments under CCCTB. This effect is due to the group loss-offset and 
the allocated consolidated tax base. Under ETAS the loss-offset limitations encroach upon 
the holding´s tax liability although no limitation is mandatory. Here, the prepaid subsidiary´s 
tax reduces the group´s tax liability and therefore, the holding´s tax payment. Although loss-
offset limitations lose their overall impact on the MNE´s Baldwin yields, it subsequently can 
be concluded that the shift of tax burden can significantly depend on these regulations or 
minimum taxation concepts. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
The model used in this paper is restricted by the underlying set of assumptions. The 
following analyses clarify the consequences of the changes in the model parameters and 
thereby allow us to draw more general conclusions. Before two major assumptions, the cash          19 
 
flow CFt and the tax rates  P τ and  S τ are analyzed in detail we briefly refer to the chosen 
allocation factors. 
In our model the resulting allocation factor for the two business entities is based on data 
generated from the BACH database for the countries Germany and France. A consideration 
of other countries in the EU; while the holding remains resident in Germany; shows a range 
of allocation factors between  5029 . 0 θ
P = / 4971 . 0 θ
S = (Germany/Spain) and 
6284 . 0 θ
P = / 3716 . 0 θ
S = (Germany/Belgium).
70,71 It is perspicuous that a change in the 
allocation factor does not lead to different determined Baldwin yields for the selected cases i) 
to vi) as the determination of taxable income and the tax rates (0.3%) apply as presumed in 
the basic scenarios. Whereas a shifting in the holding’s and the subsidiary’s tax burden 
consequently occurs due to the varying allocation factor and thus, a shifting in tax revenue 
each Member State receives. Therefore, effects on the tax allocation to the member states 
depend on the ratio of allocation formula and calculated tax base since both values are not 
necessarily identical. The bigger the gap between these two values, the greater is the shift of 
the tax payments under CCCTB in comparison to SA. In combination with different tax rates 
among the EU the impact on the tax revenue can even increase. Moreover, varying tax rates 
also affect the Baldwin yields. In case of greater tax rates in the holding´s state for both basic 
scenarios the following statement applies: The greater the allocated amount to the holding is 
the greater is the tax liability in total and the greater is the tax burden in the holding´s state.
72 
Vice versa, if an increase of the allocation factor for the holding is assumed; with a 
decreasing tax rate in the holding’s domicile while the tax rate in the subsidiary’s domicile 
stays constant; the Baldwin yields increase in the considered concepts due to lower tax 
liabilities for the multinational corporation. Decreasing tax liabilities are amplified by interest 
effects and lead to increasing Baldwin yields. As aforementioned, these elaborated effects do 
not predominantly depend on the allocation factor alone, but also on the tax rate 
combinations. Therefore a further consideration of changing tax rates for all tax systems 
follows in the next chapter. 
 
                                            
 
70 5240 . 0
P = θ / 4760 . 0
S = θ (Germany/Poland),
 
5900 . 0
P = θ / 4100 . 0
S = θ (Germany/Italy), 
 
5349 . 0
P = θ / 4651 . 0
S = θ (Germany/Austria),
 
5864 . 0
P = θ / 4136 . 0
S = θ (Germany/Portugal), 
 
6284 . 0
P = θ / 3716 . 0
S = θ (Germany/Netherlands). In general the BACH database contains non-
consolidated data. However, due to national regulations the data available for the Netherlands is the 
only consolidated data. 
71 See Appendix 1 for the generated data from the BACH database. 
72 Again, for basic scenario II  differences only apply with respect to the Austrian and Polish minimum 
taxation concepts due to the afore described reasons.          20 
 
4.4.1 Tax rates 
 
Baldwin yields 
In the previous analysis identical tax rates in either country are assumed to identify the 
general mechanism of action of both proposals. In a first step within the sensitivity analysis of 
the tax rates we simultaneously decrease the tax rates in both countries. In a second step we 
decrease either the subsidiary´s tax rate or the holding´s tax rate. In case of identical but 
decreasing tax rates we receive the same results as in our previous analysis. For all 
considered tax rate combinations and both basic scenarios the multinationals' Baldwin yields 
under ETAS and CCCTB are identical and greater than under SA due to the transnational 
loss-offset. Moreover, with decreasing (but identical) tax rates the differences of the Baldwin 
yields between SA and both reform proposals decrease as well. This is the result of 




In basic scenario II the Austrian and Polish concept have a negative impact on the 
determined Baldwin yields under both proposals in comparison to an unlimited loss-offset, 
whereas under SA all results are identical. This is due to the assumption of mandatory loss-
offset limitations in the holding´s state only. Although the Baldwin yields increase in 
comparison to SA, the occurring minimum tax decreases the Baldwin yield of the 
multinational due to the Polish and Austrian concepts' conditions.
74 In this consideration it 
becomes obvious that loss-offset limitations can have an impact in both proposals on the 
overall results, even though the impact is relatively small. Therefore, we can once more state 
that both proposals seem to decrease the negative impact of loss-offset limitations but they 
cannot eliminate them entirely. It hence plays a decisive role where the regulations are 
mandatory.  
 
The assumption of identical tax rates in the considered Member States P and S is restrictive, 
as the tax rates within the EU differ from 10% to 40%.
75 The basic scenarios are therefore 
extended to include different combinations of tax rates. In the first step we consider 
decreasing tax rates in the subsidiary´s state of domicile.   
 
                                            
 
73 In case of an unlimited loss carry-forward [concept i)] the difference decreases from 0.390% to 
0.123% in both basic scenarios. For absolute numbers see Appendix 2.2.    
74 The conditions are the loss-offset rate in the Polish concept and the corporate minimum tax liability 
of Austria. 
75 E.g. in Bulgaria and Ireland the tax rate amounts to 10 percent in 2007, whereas the tax rate in Italy 
is 37.3 percent. Cf. Scientific Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Finance (2007), p. 7.          21 
 
In all further considered tax rates combinations, the Baldwin yields under CCCTB are the 
highest due to the formula apportionment. The amount allocated to the subsidiary underlies a 
lower tax rate and therefore causes fewer tax payments than the overall applying “high” tax 
rate of the holding´s state under ETAS. Moreover, a lower tax burden can generate higher 
interest income under CCCTB which can even be increased under the assumption of 
different interest rates in the considered countries. Major fluctuations occur especially under 
ETAS. If the ETAS holding domiciles in a high-tax country, the Baldwin yields are 
significantly lower than under CCCTB or Separate Accounting due to the additive EU tax 
base. This tax base that is multiplied with a high tax rate of the holding´s state leads to a 
greater tax burden and vice versa.
76 Moreover, we can state that at a tax rate in the 
subsidiary’s domicile less than 17.8% ( 178 . 0 S ≤ τ for both scenarios) and a constant tax rate 
in the holding’s Member State ( 3 . 0 P = τ ) the Baldwin yield under SA is even greater than in 
case of ETAS. Since this specific tax rate combination is actually possible in the EU, an 
implementation of ETAS would cause distortions with a negative impact on the profitability of 
the chosen real investment of the MNE.
77  
 
Therefore, we can state that the chosen allocation factor under CCCTB is of particular 
importance especially in the real world of unequal tax rates. Moreover, in both proposals the 
tax rate differences play an important role which leads to the assumption that the choice of 
location is of importance.    
In case of a decreasing tax rate in the holding´s state of domicile, the Baldwin yields under all 
considered tax systems increase as a consequence of decreasing tax liabilities.
78 The ETAS 
achieves the highest Baldwin yields, followed by Separate Accounting. Whereas under ETAS 
the lower tax rate of the holding´s state is adopted for the whole group, the apportioned 
amount of the group´s tax base under CCCTB is more highly taxed in the subsidiary´s state. 
That is why the influence of the chosen allocation factor is once more obvious. With our 
assumption of an allocation of 44.38% of the multinational´s tax base to the subsidiary´s 
domicile the subsidiary’s allocated amount is more highly taxed than under ETAS in all 
cases, no matter which factor is chosen. For a comparison with SA no general conclusions 
can be drawn as it is restricted to this assumption. However, in our selected scenarios SA 
                                            
 
76 For further investigations cf. Sureth/Üffing (2008), p. 19-21.  
77 E.g. a real constellation of Spain, Germany, Great Britain or Luxemburg as the holding´s state and 
Bulgaria, Cyprus Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania or Rumania as the subsidiary´s state these 
results would be true. 
78 As already mentioned the results are illustrated and described for Basis scenario I. Only slight 
modifications are derived for basic scenario II, the outcomes tend to be identical.          22 
 
leads to higher Baldwin yields when the tax rate in the holding´s state is lower than 21.7% 
( 217 . 0 P ≤ τ for both scenarios).
79  
 
In this consideration two paradox results occur in case of  1 . 0 P = τ  and  3 . 0 S = τ . Under 
ETAS the German and the Austrian minimum taxation concept increase the Baldwin yields in 
comparison to an estimated unlimited loss carry-forward (+0.004%).
80 This result is due to 
the minimum taxation that applies in the subsidiary´s state and is credited against the EU 
base tax in ETAS. Since the minimum taxation occurs in the country with the greater tax rate, 
this amount is credited against the EU tax base multiplied with the lower EU tax rate of the 
holding´s state and therefore produces this positive “ETAS credit effect”.
81 This procedure 
leads to a decreasing tax liability of the holding. In turn, greater after-tax gains are enhanced 
by interest effects and increase the future value of the holding.
82 Therefore, under ETAS an 
existing minimum taxation in the subsidiary´s state can even increase the multinational´s 
Baldwin yield under special tax rate combinations.  
 
Moreover, if tax rates between 12.4% and 16.9% are assumed in the holding’s domicile, the 
loss expiration after five years produces a greater Baldwin yield than under unlimited carry-
forward. In this case it depends on the tax rate combination as well as the height of the loss 
carry-forward expiration if this regulation has an impact on the EU tax base and if an “ETAS 
credit effect” occurs at all.
83 In case of  123 . 0 P ≤ τ  the expiration after five years leads to a 
greater national already paid tax in the subsidiary’s state than the total EU base tax. The 
surplus of the EU base tax is not refundable, but must be carried forward in subsequent 
periods as EU tax credit carry-forward. Hence, this procedure leads to less cumulative 
liquidity and is intensified by the interest effect over time.  
 
 
                                            
 
79 E.g. a real constellation of Spain, Germany, Great Britain or Luxemburg as the subsidiary´s state 
and Bulgaria, Cyprus Republic, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Rumania or Slovakia as the holding´s state these results would be true. 
80 In basic scenario I the threshold for this effect; when the concepts of Austria and Germany have a 
positive effect on the Baldwin yields; is 16.9% ( 169 . 0 P ≤ τ ). An overview of all results can be seen in 
the Appendix 2.1 and 2.3. 
81 Therefore, a different assumption for a flat tax rate in ETAS would change the results. But the 
general effect remains, that for special tax rate combination the “ETAS credit effect” can occur when 
minimum taxation is mandatory in the subsidiary´s state of domicile. 
82 E.g. in the German concept the occurring minimum taxation in period 7 leads to a by €52.5k greater 
cumulative liquidity of the holding compared to the assumed unlimited loss-offset. The complete 
amount is €52,523.92. In Austria the minimum taxation occurs in t = 5 and increases the cumulative 
liquidity by €4,230.00 in comparison to the unlimited loss carry-forward. In case of a loss-expiration 
after five years in period t = 8 a difference of €10,460.52 is achieved.  
          23 
 
Tax allocation 
In line with the aforementioned impact on the Baldwin yields we can state that decreasing tax 
rates decrease the tax liability. Moreover, under identical tax rates we show a reallocation of 
tax burden, whereas the holding´s country of domicile receives less tax payments under 
ETAS than under CCCTB, depending on the chosen allocation factor.  
 
With decreasing tax rates in the subsidiary´s state the overall group's tax liability decreases 
and the Baldwin yield therefore increases in both proposals to different extents. As 
aforementioned, under CCCTB the holding has to pay fewer taxes in tendency than under 
SA due to the transnational loss-offset. Whereas under ETAS the tax payment of the 
subsidiary stays identical, the higher holding´s tax rate is adopted for the group's tax base 
and therefore causes higher tax payments of the holding for all considered tax rate 
combinations of  178 . 0 S ≤ τ and  3 . 0 P = τ . 
Therefore, we can state that ETAS can discriminate cross-border real investments in case of 
greater tax rates in the holding´s state. In comparison to ETAS the implementation of CCCTB 
can foster cross-border real investments due to the allocated amounts. In case of a 
decreasing tax rate in the holding´s state we receive opposite results. Here, the adopted 
lower tax rate under ETAS leads to a lower tax burden than under CCCTB. An 
implementation of CCCTB in this case would lead to the greatest tax liability for the 
multinational and simultaneously to the greatest tax reallocation. A further decrease of the 
holding´s tax rate leads to decreasing tax burden in the holding´s state, but to increasing 
payments of the subsidiary, although no change in the subsidiary’s tax rate takes place. 
Again, these effects significantly depend on the chosen allocation factor.  
Therefore, we found that ETAS is tax favored since the lower tax rate of the holding's state is 
applied on the EU base tax and hence, is adopted for the whole group. Moreover, since the 
tax liability under CCCTB is greater than under SA
84 we can state that CCCTB can 
discriminate cross-border real investments in case of greater tax rates in the subsidiary´s 
state. However, this conclusion depends on the tax rate differences between the EU Member 
States the multinational corporation is operating in.  
Consequently, we can state that ETAS can discriminate cross-border real investments in 
case of greater tax rates in the holding´s state whereas CCCTB can foster them, depending 
                                            
 
84 E.g. +€181,111.18 for case i) and  2 . 0 P = τ and  3 . 0 S = τ   and +€1,340,218.33 for  1 . 0 P = τ  
and 3 . 0 S = τ .          24 
 
on the allocation factor.
85 Vice versa, in case of lower tax rates in the subsidiary´s state 
CCCTB can discriminate and ETAS can foster the considered real investments in case of 
start-up losses in the subsidiary. In both proposals the decreasing tax burdens are in 
tendency to the account of the holding´s state. 
 
4.4.2 Cash flow  
 
So far, we presumed an exogenously predetermined cash flow parameter. For the first period 
the cash flow was predetermined exogenously at the subsidiary’s (€1M) and the holding’s 
level (€1.3M), whereas a periodic growth of the cash flow amounting to €500k is only 
assumed at the subsidiary’s level. In this section we analyze how modifications of these 
exogenously predetermined cash flows affect the different tax concepts.  
Based on the aforementioned impacts under ETAS for the tax rate combination of 
169 . 0 P = τ  and  3 . 0 S = τ  (section 4.4.1) we now decrease the subsidiary´s first-period cash 
flow to investigate further effects of all occurring loss-offset limitations.
86 Therefore, we obtain 
the following parameter changes, other parameters stay identical:   
Tax rate in the holding’s country of domicile
P τ  = 0.169 
Tax rate in the subsidiary’s country of domicile
S τ  = 0.3 
Cash flow generated in the subsidiary in t=1
1 t , S CF =  = -€1,100,000 
Table 2: Overview of parameter change  
Since the general allocation effects are already described in section 4.4.1 we now focus on 
the Baldwin yields under ETAS and CCCTB in this section. With a decrease of the 
subsidiary's first cash flow by €100k to  M 1 . 1 € CF
S
1 − =  it is obvious that all selected loss-offset 
concepts lead to identical Baldwin yields under ETAS and CCCTB. This result is due to the 
fact that under ETAS the growth rate leads to subsequent occurring gains in the subsidiary 
that can be offset against the loss carry-forward. This offset itself leads to a lower minimum 
taxation impact in total and hence, to a declining holding´s tax liability in comparison to the 
starting scenario. An increase by €0.1M (viz., M 9 . 0 € CF
S
1 − = ) instead remains the tax favored 
situation under ETAS for the German and the Austrian concept as well as for the loss 
                                            
 
85 In comparison to the actual situation (SA).  
86 Therefore, the subsequent cash flows decrease respectively, since we keep the growth amount of 
€0.5M.          25 
 
expiration after five years. Therefore, the ETAS tax credit mechanism in combination with 
additional interest effects can cause these distortions.  
 
A further increase of the initial cash flow of the subsidiary decreases the differences between 
the Baldwin yields of the loss-offset limitations and the unlimited carry-forward and leads to 
similar Baldwin yields. E.g. the impact of the loss expiration after five years decreases with a 
decreasing subsidiary´s first cash flow. At  M 7 . 0 € CF
S
1 − < the tax beneficial impact on the 
Baldwin yield disappears since with decreasing cash flows the loss carry-forward decreases 
respectively and no further expiration occurs.
87 We can state once more that depending on 
the tax rate combination, as well as the cash flows, existing loss-offset limitations can lead to 




Another situation to be considered is the case when losses occur within the holding and 
profits are gained in the subsidiary. Therefore, in the next investigation we change the 
following parameters but keep the identical tax rates of 30%.
89  
Cash flow generated in the holding in t=1
1 t , P CF =  = -€1,000,000 
Cash flow generated in the subsidiary in t=1
1 t , S CF =  = €1,000,000 
Periodic alteration in cash flows (holding) P g  = €500,000 
Periodic growth amount of cash flows (subsidiary) S g  = €0 
Table 3: Overview of parameter change  
In scenario I the loss-offset limitations do not affect the results because gains only are 
achieved in the country where they are mandatory. Therefore, within the respective tax 
system; SA, CCCTB and ETAS; all Baldwin yields are identical. In basic scenario I, CCCTB 
leads to greater Baldwin yields in comparison to SA [+0.055% for i)] and ETAS to lower ones        
[-0.145% for i)]. Under ETAS a new effect can be investigated in case that the already paid 
taxes of the subsidiary exceed the total tax liability of the group. Due to the EU tax credit 
carry-forward this tax backlog does not lead to an immediate tax refund. It is rather carried 
                                            
 
87 Similar results can be found for the German concept. In this case the effect disappears for 
. M 4 . 0 € CF
S
1 =    
88 Different interest rates in the countries; depending on the combination; can increase or decrease 
these effects. If the tax rates in the holding´s country are greater than in the subsidiary and so are the 
interest rates the “EU tax credit effect” can be fortified and vice versa. 
89 All the not mentioned parameters remain due to the previous deterministic analysis.           26 
 
forward and can be offset against the tax liability of the subsidiary in subsequent years.
90 
This “ETAS tax credit carry-forward effect” in addition to the interest effect causes the lowest 
Baldwin yield for all considered loss offset cases.  
 
In basic scenario II the respective loss-offset limitations are implemented in the holding´s 
state and therefore have an impact on the Baldwin yields. The overall result that CCCTB 
increases the Baldwin yields and ETAS decreases the Baldwin yields still remains and can 
be seen in Table 4. Here, the second and the third column show the Baldwin yield difference 
between both proposal and SA. The last two columns present the Baldwin yield differences 
between the respective loss-offset concepts and the unlimited loss carry-forward [concept i)] 
within the proposals.  
CCCTB ETAS CCCTB ETAS
i) Unlimited loss carry-forward 0.055% -0.145% / /
ii) Minimum taxation concept Germany 0.055% -0.145% 0.000% 0.000%
iii) Minimum taxation concept Austria 0.055% -0.097% -0.005% 0.043%
iv) Minimum taxation concept Poland 0.051% -0.103% -0.004% 0.042%
v) Loss-offset limitation I (5 years) 0.055% -0.145% 0.000% 0.000%
vi) Loss-offset limitation II (8 years) 0.055% -0.145% 0.000% 0.000%
Basic Scenario II  difference to SA difference to i)
 
Table 4: Impact of the proposals on the Baldwin yield and impact of the loss-offset 
limitation concepts within the proposals 
Whereas under SA only the Austrian concept causes a minimum taxation and decreases the 
Baldwin yield under CCCTB and ETAS, the Austrian as well as the Polish concept affects the 
Baldwin yields (column two and three). In this consideration we investigate those national 
minimum taxation regulations. Although they do not impact the national context (e.g. the 
Polish concept under SA), they could encroach upon the group level and affect the MNE´s 
Baldwin yield. While under CCCTB an existing minimum tax reduces the Baldwin yield of the 
multinational (-0.005%; -0.004%); under ETAS the paradox effect of an increased Baldwin 
yields occurs (0.043%; 0.042%).
91 
 
For the first time in our consideration both ETAS tax credit mechanism effects occur 
simultaneously. The “ETAS tax credit carry-forward effect” leads to a tax backlog that is not 
refundable and therefore increases the tax payments of the multinational. This effect can be 
considered as the obvious differences between SA and ETAS [-0.145% for concept i)]. The 
“ETAS tax credit effect” leads to an increase of the Baldwin yield instead because occurring 
minimum taxation can be credited against the group´s tax liability. This effect can be seen in 
                                            
 
90 For further investigations cf. Sureth/Üffing (2008). 
91 That can be seen in the fourth and fifth column, in the difference to the unlimited loss carry-forward.          27 
 
the difference within ETAS and between the unlimited loss carry-forward and the Austrian 
(0.043%) or the Polish (0.042%) concept. Therefore, we can state, that the “negative 
affecting ETAS tax credit carry-forward effect” is more than three times greater than the 
“positive affecting ETAS tax credit effect”.   
 
Finally, we can state that depending on the cash flow structure as well as on the origin of 
losses, discriminating and subsidized impacts on cross-border investment decisions of 
multinationals can occur. The following overview shows the gained analysis results.  
 
4.4.3 Analysis results 
 
Having conducted diverse parameter changes during our sensitivity analysis we can draw 
the following conclusions: 
•  Both considered group taxation proposals lead to an identical increase of the Baldwin 
yields (BY) and therefore to increasing profitability in comparison to SA in case of 
identical tax rates.   
•  Whereas under ETAS the determined Baldwin yield depends on the holding’s tax 
rate, under CCCTB the chosen allocation factor also plays a decisive role.  
•  CCCTB seems to be more susceptible for tax rate differences within the group than 
ETAS. In general the following effects occur (with BY: Baldwin Yield, τ: tax rate, H: 
holding, S: subsidiary): 
a) If  τH < τS   then BYCCCTB < BYETAS,  
  and in some combinations even BYCCCTB < BYSA. 
b) If  τH > τS   then BYETAS < BYCCCTB,  
  and in some combinations even BYETAS < BYSA.  
•  ETAS can cause less tax payment redistributions than CCCTB, depending on the 
formula apportionment, since under ETAS the subsidiary´s state tax liability stays 
similar to SA. However, a decreasing tax liability in total has to be “borne” by the 
holding´s state only.  
•  If a national loss-offset limitation exists, the impact is minimized or at least reduced 
since the consolidation of the holding and the subsidiary achieves a cross-border 
offset. By contrast, mandatory minimum taxation concepts can encroach upon the 
group level under special circumstances, but the impact on the Baldwin yields seems 
to be slight. ETAS can cause a profitability increasing tax effect as well as a 
decreasing tax effect due to the EU tax credit mechanism.  
a)  The profitability increasing tax effect in the form of a tax paradox follows from a 
minimum taxation (or loss expiration) in the subsidiary´s state while τH > τS. The          28 
 
“ETAS credit effect” in conjunction with interest effects leads to increasing Baldwin 
yields. An identical effect can be observed for different negative cash flows within 
the holding.  
b)  The profitability decreasing tax effect is the “ETAS tax credit carry-forward effect” 
emerging when the subsidiary´s national tax liability exceeds the total tax liability 
of the group. Since this tax backlog is not refunded immediately but carried-
forward, the tax payments in combination with the interest effect lead to 





The focus of this paper was to analyze the effect of an implementation of two group taxation 
proposals, ETAS and CCCTB, on the profitability of a MNE’s cross-border real investment. 
We integrated currently existing loss-offset regulations within the EU to enrich the partial 
analysis.  
 
Our results provide first brief insights into the tax reform proposals’ impacts in combination 
with existing national loss-offset and minimum taxation regulations. The analyses show that 
replacing Separate Accounting by either concept can lead to increasing profitability due to 
cross-border loss compensation. In line with former literature the paper indicates that if the 
profitability increases, the main criteria of decisions on location are the tax rate divergences 
within the Member States. High tax rate differentials in the Member States imply significant 
redistribution of tax payments under CCCTB and ETAS. Under ETAS, tax competition can 
distort the results through the tax rate as well as the tax base. Under CCCTB a second 
crucial impact, based on the chosen formula apportionment can cause severe distortions in 
combination with the tax rate differences. Moreover, both proposals cause tax payment 
redistributions in comparison to the status quo. The results indicate that this tax payment 
reallocation occurs at the expense of the holding´s state for both tax reform proposals.  
 
We show that the tax effects from mandatory loss-offset limitations in either group taxation 
concept can lose their impact on the profitability. Moreover, ETAS can cause distortions due 
to the credit mechanism which has to be considered closely. In many countries, a method to 
prevent double taxation is the credit method that could also be an imaginable solution for EU-
wide cross-border group taxation under ETAS and for ensuring EU Member States' tax 
revenue. Further analyses with a limited credit method for the tax credit of the subsidiary will 
be necessary for ETAS to analyze possible effects resulting from double taxation.           29 
 
 
Against the expected decreasing impact of the national loss-offset regulations we found 
scenarios in which national loss-offset limitations in form of a minimum taxation can also 
encroach upon the group level.  In a system of SA we identify prerequisites and assumptions 
in which loss-offset limitations do not affect the MNE’s cross-border real investments, but in 
which a negative impact on cross-border real investments appears under the analyzed tax 
reform proposals. These effects depend on the choice of location and the mandatory loss-
offset regulations. However, these impacts have to be considered closely, since they can 
have a severe impact on the tax liability.  
 
The actual development of implementing EU-wide group taxation in form of a CCCTB seems 
to stagnate. Hence, it could be helpful to include elements of ETAS in further considerations. 
As the results show, the reallocation under CCCTB increases due to the chosen formula 
apportionment, whereas under ETAS the reallocation approximates more to SA. 
Furthermore, we identify that under ETAS harmful paradoxes can occur in case of mandatory 
minimum taxation concepts due to the credit mechanism. Therefore, it is helpful to identify 
advantages and disadvantages of the credit mechanism provided in ETAS and e.g., to 
elaborate the effects of a partly tax credit as Hernler also proposed. This investigation could 
also serve as support for the concept Separate Entity Accounting.
92   
 
Nevertheless, as our results confirm, the problems of non-uniform reporting standards and 
tax rate divergences remain in both tax reform proposals. Additionally, tax base differences 
under ETAS also persist and new distortions can occur due to formula apportionment (under 
CCCTB). The aforementioned obstacles of either new group taxation can only be overcome 
in case of a tax rate and tax base harmonization within the EU.  
 
Although for both proposals several questions remain unclear our analysis has to be filled 
with numerous assumptions our results can contribute to an illuminative anticipation of the 
tax effects in the current discussion for a corporate group tax harmonization within the EU as 
well as other economic zones, e.g. the US. 
 
                                            
 


































Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
France 549,962,004  1,807 304,351 14.8 1,310,587 725  12.7
           
Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
Poland 104,908,327  512 204,899 39.1 528,732 1,032  6.5
      
Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
Spain 150,481,248  311 483,863 19.5 278,333 895  8.6
      
Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
Belgium 149,983,292  523 286,775 8.2 265,127  507  11.1
      
Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
Italy 449,235,524  2.228 201,632 18.1 1,090,196 489  11.2
      
Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
Netherlands 180,205,585  329 547,737 9.0 276,892 842  9.7
      
Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
Austria 54,939,560  269 204.236 25.6 168,443 626  17.3
      
Germany 827,317,910  1,664 497,186 13.1 1,859,306 1,117  15.6
Portugal 29,379,014  174 168,845 24.8 88,693 510  8.5         31 
 
App. 2.1: Table of the Baldwin yields of the sensitivity analysis of the tax rates 
SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS
i )  11.8 6 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .13 1% 12 .74 6 % 12 .18 7% 12 .3 9 1% 13 .2 9 1% 12 .18 7%
ii) 1 1 .857% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 24% 1 2.746% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.387% 1 3.291 % 1 2.1 87%
iii) 1 1 .849% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 1 7% 1 2.746% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.384% 1 3.291 % 1 2.1 87%
i v)  11.8 6 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .13 1% 12 .74 6 % 12 .18 7% 12 .3 9 1% 13 .2 9 1% 12 .18 7%
v) 1 1 .606% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 1 .959% 1 2.746% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.306% 1 3.291 % 1 2.1 87%
vi )  11.8 6 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .13 1% 12 .74 6 % 12 .18 7% 12 .3 9 1% 13 .2 9 1% 12 .18 7%
SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS
i )  11.8 6 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .13 1% 12 .74 6 % 12 .18 7% 12 .3 9 1% 13 .2 9 1% 12 .18 7%
i i )  11.8 6 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .13 1% 12 .74 6 % 12 .18 7% 12 .3 9 1% 13 .2 9 1% 12 .18 7%
iii) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 31 % 1 2.746% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.391 % 1 3.290% 1 2.1 87%
iv) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 84% 1 2.1 84% 1 2.1 31 % 1 2.743% 1 2.1 84% 1 2.391 % 1 3.288% 1 2.1 84%
v) 11.8 6 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .13 1% 12 .74 6 % 12 .18 7% 12 .3 9 1% 13 .2 9 1% 12 .18 7%
vi )  11.8 6 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .18 7% 12 .13 1% 12 .74 6 % 12 .18 7% 12 .3 9 1% 13 .2 9 1% 12 .18 7%
SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS
i) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
ii) 1 1 .857% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.945% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.029% 1 3.562% 1 4.447%
iii) 1 1 .849% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.937% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.023% 1 3.562% 1 4.447%
iv) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
v) 1 1 .606% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.71 5% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 3.81 9% 1 3.562% 1 4.442%
vi) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS SA CCCTB ETAS
i) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
ii) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
iii) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.426% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
iv) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 84% 1 2.1 84% 1 2.954% 1 2.882% 1 3.425% 1 4.038% 1 3.560% 1 4.442%
v) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
vi) 1 1 .867% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.1 87% 1 2.954% 1 2.885% 1 3.427% 1 4.038% 1 3.562% 1 4.443%
SCENARIO II
τP=0.3, τS=0.3 τP=0.2, τS=0.3 τP=0.1, τS=0.3






τP=0.3, τS=0.3 τP=0.3, τS=0.2 τP=0.3, τS=0.1
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App. 2.2: Table of the tax allocation of decreasing tax rates in the subsidiary´s state 
 
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €       1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
ii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,969,91 6.44 €      1 0,930,1 69.21 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 52,942.47 €       1,969,916.44 €     1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
iii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,989,91 8.69 €      10,950,171.46 €       5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 32,940.23 €      1,989,918.69 €     10,122,858.92 €   
iv) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €       1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
v) 8,960,252.77 €     2,569,1 06.66 €     1 1 ,529,359.43 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    7,553,752.25 €        2,569,1 06.66 €     1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
vi) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €       1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,820,650.09 €     1 ,302,208.83 €    10,122,858.92 €   
ii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,320,371 .49 €      1 0,280,624.26 €    5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,802,487.43 €     1 ,320,371 .49 €      10,122,858.92 €   
iii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,335,788.27 €      10,296,041.04 €     5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,787,080.64 €      1,335,788.27 €      1 0,1 22,868.91 €    
iv) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,820,650.09 €     1 ,302,208.82 €    1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
v) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,723,736.28 €      1 0,683,989.05 €     5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,399,1 22.63 €      1 ,723,736.28 €     1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
vi) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,820,640.09 €     1 ,302,208.82 €    1 0,1 22,848.91 €    
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,469,424.81 €      653,434.1 1 €         10,122,858.92 €   
ii) 8,960,252.77 €     663,756.33 €        9,624,009.1 0 €       5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,459,1 02.59 €       663,756.33 €        10,122,858.92 €   
iii) 8,960,252.77 €     672,51 6.85 €          9,632,769.62 €      5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,450,342.07 €      672,51 6.85 €         10,122,858.92 €   
iv) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,469,424.81 €      653,434.1 1 €         10,122,858.92 €   
v) 8,960,252.77 €     867,390.1 6 €         9,827,642.93 €      5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,255,468.75 €       867,390.1 6 €        1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
vi) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,469,424.81 €      653,434.1 1 €         10,122,858.92 €   
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €       1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
ii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,969,91 6.44 €      1 0,930,1 69.21 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €       1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
iii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,989,91 8.69 €      10,950,171.46 €       5,630,834.37 €    4,492,923.94 €    10,123,758.31 €     8,1 77,434.1 6 €        1,946,324.14 €     10,123,758.30 €    
iv) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €      5,634,576.1 1 €       4,495,909.52 €     1 0,1 30,485.63 €    8,1 84,1 61 .49 €        1,946,324.14 €     10,130,485.63 €   
v) 8,960,252.77 €     2,569,324.1 4 €     1 1 ,529,576.91 €        5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €       1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
vi) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €      5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     1 0,1 22,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €       1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,820,650.09 €     1 ,302,208.82 €    1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
ii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,820,650.09 €     1 ,302,208.82 €    1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
iii) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,867.57 €     324,025.20 €        6,008,892.77 €     8,821 ,549.48 €      1 ,302,208.82 €    10,123,758.30 €    
iv) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,688,946.41 €     3,026,1 94.91 €      8,715,141.32 €        8,828,276.80 €     1 ,302,208.82 €    10,130,485.62 €   
v) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,820,650.09 €     1 ,302,208.82 €    1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
vi) 8,960,252.77 €     1 ,302,208.82 €     10,262,461.59 €      5,684,322.06 €    3,023,735.02 €     8,708,057.08 €     8,820,650.09 €     1 ,302,208.82 €    1 0,1 22,858.91 €    
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,469,424.81 €      653,434.1 1 €         10,122,858.92 €   
ii) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,469,424.81 €      653,434.1 1 €         10,122,858.92 €   
iii) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,739,544.21 €      1,526,555.03 €       7,266,099.24 €    9,470,324.1 9 €      653,434.1 1 €         10,123,758.30 €    
iv) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,743,974.27 €     1,527,733.30 €      7,271,707.57 €        9,477,051 .52 €        653,434.1 1 €         10,130,485.63 €   
v) 8,960,252.77 €     653,434.1 1 €          9,61 3,686.88 €       5,738,951 .51 €       1 ,526,397.39 €      7,265,348.90 €     9,469,424.81 €      653,434.1 1 €         10,122,858.92 €   
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App. 2.3: Table of the tax allocation of decreasing tax rates in the holding´s state 
 
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €     5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
ii) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,969,91 6.44 €      10,930,169.21 €     5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 52,942.47 €     1 ,969,91 6.44 €     10,122,858.91 €    
iii) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,989,91 8.69 €      10,950,171.46 €      5,630,334.13 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 32,940.23 €    1 ,989,91 8.69 €     10,122,858.92 €   
iv) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €     5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
v) 8,960,252.77 €    2,569,324.1 4 €     11,529,576.91 €      5,630,334.13 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    7,553,752.25 €      2,569,1 06.66 €    10,122,858.91 €    
vi) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €     5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,949,1 45.1 8 €      1,946,324.14 €     6,895,469.32 €    
ii) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,969,91 6.44 €      8,1 87,806.1 6 €       3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,925,552.87 €     1 ,969,91 6.44 €     6,895,469.31 €     
iii) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,989,91 8.69 €      8,207,808.41 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,905,550.63 €     1 ,989,91 8.69 €     6,895,469.32 €    
iv) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,949,1 45.1 8 €      1,946,324.14 €     6,895,469.32 €    
v) 6,21 7,889.72 €     2,569,1 06.66 €     8,786,996.38 €     3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,326,362.65 €    2,569,1 06.66 €    6,895,469.31 €     
vi) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,949,1 45.1 8 €      1,946,324.14 €     6,895,469.32 €    
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      2,158,785.43 €      1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,000,071 .1 2 €      
ii) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,969,91 6.44 €      5,207,133.07 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      2,01 8,989.37 €     1 ,969,91 6.44 €     3,988,905.81 €     
iii) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,989,91 8.69 €      5,227,135.32 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      1,998,426.32 €    1 ,989,91 8.69 €     3,988,345.01 €     
iv) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      2,158,785.43 €      1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,000,071 .1 2 €      
v) 3,237,21 6.63 €    2,569,1 06.66 €     5,806,323.29 €     1 ,922,290.1 1 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      1,745,562.48 €      2,257,685.70 €     4,003,248.1 8 €    
vi) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      2,158,785.43 €      1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,000,071 .1 2 €      
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €     5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
ii) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,969,91 6.44 €      10,930,169.21 €     5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
iii) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,989,91 8.69 €      10,950,171.46 €      5,630,834.37 €     4,492,923.94 €    10,123,758.31 €     8,1 77,434.1 6 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,123,758.30 €    
iv) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €     5,634,576.1 1 €       4,495,909.52 €     10,130,485.63 €    8,1 84,1 61 .49 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,130,485.63 €   
v) 8,960,252.77 €    2,569,324.1 4 €     11,529,576.91 €      5,630,334.13 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
vi) 8,960,252.77 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      10,906,576.91 €     5,630,334.1 3 €     4,492,524.79 €     10,122,858.92 €    8,1 76,534.78 €      1,946,324.14 €     10,122,858.92 €   
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,949,1 45.1 8 €      1,946,324.14 €     6,895,469.32 €    
ii) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,949,1 45.1 8 €      1,946,324.14 €     6,895,469.32 €    
iii) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,799,1 02.82 €     4,547,038.38 €     8,346,1 41 .20 €      4,949,870.28 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €     6,896,1 94.42 €    
iv) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,801 ,880.45 €     4,550,362.85 €     8,352,243.30 €    4,955,289.55 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €     6,901 ,61 3.69 €     
v) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,949,1 45.1 8 €      1,946,324.14 €     6,895,469.32 €    
vi) 6,21 7,889.72 €     1 ,946,324.1 4 €      8,1 64,21 3.86 €      3,798,731 .31 €       4,546,593.73 €     8,345,325.04 €     4,949,1 45.1 8 €      1,946,324.14 €     6,895,469.32 €    
Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum Holding´s state subsidiary´s state Sum
i) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      2,158,785.43 €      1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,000,071 .1 2 €      
ii) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      2,158,785.43 €      1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,000,071 .1 2 €      
iii) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1 ,922,495.89 €     4,601 ,961 .58 €      6,524,457.47 €      2,1 59,224.76 €     1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,000,51 0.45 €     
iv) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1 ,924,033.72 €     4,605,642.74 €     6,529,676.46 €     2,1 62,505.49 €     1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,003,791 .1 8 €      
v) 3,237,21 6.63 €    1 ,946,324.1 4 €      5,183,540.77 €       1,922,290.11 €       4,601,468.99 €     6,523,759.10 €      2,158,785.43 €      1,8 4 1,2 8 5.6 9 €     4,000,071 .1 2 €      
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